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This paper considers the marriage problem under dynamic rematching. It is shown that 
if players who obtain higher payoffs are less likely to experiment with non-best response 
behavior, then matchings selected in the long run will belong to the set of Rawlsian stable 
matchings – the set of stable matchings which maximize the payoff of the worst off player. 
Conversely, alternative behavioral rules will fail to select Rawlsian stable matchings in some 
environments. This constitutes an evolutionary axiomatization of Rawlsian stable matchings 
in terms of the behavioral rules that give rise to them.
© 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
It is common in evolutionary economics to assume that agents follow explicit behavioral rules. From this, implications for 
society are derived. For example, in the classic marriage model of two sided matching (Gale and Shapley, 1962), play under 
pairwise best response dynamics converges to the core (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). In two strategy coordination games, 
play under certain perturbed best response dynamics (Young, 1993; Kandori et al., 1993) converges to the risk dominant 
Nash equilibrium. Such models can be interpreted as giving sufficient conditions on underlying behavior for the emergence 
of a given social norm.
Necessary conditions on behavior for the emergence of a social norm are not usually given. Striking exceptions to this are 
Blume (2003) and Maruta (2002), who give necessary and sufficient conditions on perturbed individualistic best response 
dynamics for convergence to the risk dominant Nash equilibrium of a two strategy coordination game played in a popula-
tion. These results can be interpreted as behavioral axiomatizations of the form: “Solution X will emerge from a dynamic 
process of strategy updating if and only if conditions Y on behavior are satisfied.” Such an axiomatic approach provides a 
rigorous and comprehensive answer to how robust any given social norm is to misspecification of the behavioral rule, thus 
providing a context-specific investigation of the Bergin and Lipman (1996) critique that the identity of emergent norms may 
be non-robust to variations in the behavioral rule.
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we characterize Rawlsian stable matchings – stable matchings which maximize the payoff of the worst off player (see Rawls, 
1971; Masarani and Gokturk, 1989), in terms of the behavior that leads to the emergence of such matchings under an 
evolutionary process.
Consider pairwise dynamics that differ from Roth and Vande Vate (1990) in that there is some small probability of 
players choosing non-best responses. When the propensity of a player to play a non-best response decreases in his current 
payoff, almost to the exclusion of other considerations, we say that he follows a condition dependent behavioral rule (Bilancini 
and Boncinelli, 2020).1 An interpretation is that players who earn high payoffs are less inclined to experimentally change 
their behavior in search of higher payoffs.
Our ‘sufficiency’ theorem (Theorem 1) shows that Rawlsian stable matchings emerge when players follow condition 
dependent behavioral rules. Specifically, Rawlsian stable matchings are stochastically stable (Foster and Young, 1990). This 
result, while interesting, is a mostly straightforward application of the one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching 
problems (Newton and Sawa, 2015).
Our ‘necessity’ theorem (Theorem 2) shows that condition dependence is necessary to guarantee Rawlsian stability. That 
is, every rule that is not condition dependent will fail to select Rawlsian stable matchings in some environment. This is 
the more novel aspect of the paper, and is proved constructively. Given a behavioral rule that is not condition dependent, 
and given sets of men and women on either side of the matching market, we find payoffs under which there exists a 
stochastically stable matching which is not Rawlsian.
A germane comparison is to traditional axiomatic approaches. These express solution concepts in terms of the satisfac-
tion of some desirable property (e.g. Pareto efficiency, monotonicity) of the solution itself. That is, the axioms are restrictions 
placed directly on the solution. The approach of the current paper is to express a solution concept (Rawlsian stable match-
ing) in terms of the behavioral rules that give rise to it (condition dependent rules). That is, the axioms are restrictions 
placed on behavior.
It is worth noting that an appealing behavioral rule will not necessarily lead to a solution concept with intuitively 
appealing properties. For example, Hwang et al. (2018a) show that the logit choice rule gives rise to a bargaining solution 
that fails to satisfy many of the appealing properties satisfied by standard bargaining solutions.2 In the current paper both 
the behavioral rule and the emergent social norm have independent appeal. Condition dependent rules can be understood 
as abiding by a maxim to “focus on what you have, not on what you do not have”, or in the words of the Decalogue, “thou 
shalt not covet”. Regarding the social norm, Rawls (1971) gives a philosophical argument in favor of structuring institutions 
to maximize the wellbeing of the worst off in society, subject to the restraints of maintaining a liberal society and due 
consideration for future generations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some related literature. Section 3 gives the model. Section 4 gives 
the main results. Section 6 concludes. Ancillary results and proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2. Related literature
There is a significant literature that considers the emergence of norms in matching problems. For matching problems 
with non-transferable utility, pairwise best response (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990) and pairwise best response with uniform 
deviations (Jackson and Watts, 2002) select the set of stable matchings. Newton and Sawa (2015) give general methodology 
for such models and show that coalitional logit choice (Sawa, 2014) selects a non-transferable utility version of the least 
core (Maschler et al., 1979).3
Similarly, for matching with transferable utility, it has been shown that pairwise best response (Chen et al., 2016; Biró et 
al., 2013; Klaus and Payot, 2015; Nax et al., 2013) and pairwise best response with uniform deviations (Klaus and Newton, 
2016) select the core (Gillies, 1959); coalitional logit selects the least core (Nax and Pradelski, 2015); and a logit-like class 
of weakly payoff dependent processes will select the interior core if there is a unique optimal matching, but may further 
restrict selection when there are multiple optimal matchings (Klaus and Newton, 2016).
The above papers are all part of the Evolutionary Nash Program that considers links between evolutionary game theory 
and cooperative game theory. Furthermore, in considering pairwise behavioral rules, they are part of the literature on 
evolution and collective agency (see Newton, 2018, for a survey covering both of these literatures).
The most well known axiomatizations of solution concepts are probably those of the Nash (1950), Kalai and Smorodinsky 
(1975) and Egalitarian (Kalai, 1977) bargaining solutions. However, there has been work on the axiomatization of solutions 
to problems of matching and object allocation. For example, axiomatizations have been given for allocation rules such as 
1 This terminology follows from the evolutionary biology literature suggesting that organisms in a worse ‘condition’ have a higher mutation rate (Agrawal, 
2002).
2 For an overview of the logit choice rule, see Alós-Ferrer and Netzer (2010). More generally, logit choice is a member of the classes of skew-symmetric
rules (Blume, 2003), payoff-based rules (Peski, 2010) and payoff-difference based rules (Newton, 2019). These classes share the common feature that the 
probability of a deviation decreases in the payoff loss to oneself, and in the latter case possibly also to others, from the deviation in question.
3 Pairwise best response (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990) is a natural extension of best response (Cournot, 1838). Pairwise best response with uniform 
deviations (Jackson and Watts, 2002) is a natural extension of best response with uniform perturbations (Young, 1993; Kandori et al., 1993). Coalitional 
logit choice (Sawa, 2014) is a natural extension of logit choice (e.g. Blume, 1993).
70 E. Bilancini et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 123 (2020) 68–80deferred acceptance (Kojima and Manea, 2010; Ehlers and Klaus, 2016), immediate acceptance (Doğan and Klaus, 2018; 
Kojima and Ünver, 2014), top trading cycles (Ma, 1994) and serial dictatorship (Svensson, 1999).
Finally, we note that recent experimental evidence shows that behavior in the lab is highly consistent with the myopic 
best response rule in simple coordination games, and that deviations from such rules vary with patterns of realized and 
expected payoffs (Mäs and Nax, 2016; Lim and Neary, 2016; Hwang et al., 2018b). In at least one case (Mäs and Nax, 2016) 
deviations are best explained by the condition dependent model (Bilancini et al., 2020).
3. Model
3.1. The marriage problem
We follow the description of the marriage problem in Jackson and Watts (2002). There is a set of players, N , which is 
divided into a set of men, M = {m1, . . . , mk}, with k ≥ 2, and a set of women, W = {w1, . . . , wl}, with l ≥ 2. An undirected 
network g is a set of edges, each edge comprising a pair of players {i, j} ⊂ N , i = j. We denote {i, j} by i j so that i j ∈ g
indicates that there is an edge between players i and j in network g . Let G denote the set of all undirected networks on N . 
Let g(i) = { j : i j ∈ g} denote the set of players linked to player i in network g . g(i) = ∅ means that i is single in g . The set 
of matchings in the marriage problem, G , is the set of undirected networks in which each woman is linked to at most one 
man, and each man is linked to at most one woman:
G = {g ∈G : (∀ i j ∈ g, i ∈ M ⇔ j ∈ W ), (∀ i ∈ N, |g(i)| ≤ 1)}.
In a slight abuse of notation, we sometimes write g(i) = j for g(i) = { j}.
The vector of utilities obtained from network g by the players is given by u : G →R|N| . Player i obtains payoff ui(g) from 
network g , and this payoff depends only on the match of i. That is, for each i, ui(g) = ui(g′) if g(i) = g′(i). We assume that 
players are never indifferent between two potential matches: g(i) = g′(i) implies that ui(g) = ui(g′). Therefore, if g(i) = ∅, 
then ui(g) = ui({ig(i)}), and if g(i) = ∅, then ui(g) = ui(∅). We denote by U the set of all possible vectors of utilities u. 
Define
g − i j := g \ {i j}
as the network g with the edge i j removed if it exists in g . Similarly, define








k = j and l ∈ g( j)
)}
∪ {i j}
as the network g with the edge i j added and any existing edges exiting i and j removed.
Definition 1. A matching g ∈ G is (pairwise) stable if:
(i) ∀ i j ∈ g, ui(g) > ui(g − i j).
(ii)  i ∈ M, j ∈ W : ui(g + i j) > ui(g) and u j(g + i j) > u j(g).
We denote the set of stable matchings by S . The set of stable matchings corresponds to the core of the problem: the set 
of matchings from which no subset of players can improve their payoffs by removing and adding edges in a coordinated 
manner.
A stable matching is Rawlsian if it is amongst the stable matchings that maximize the lowest payoff amongst all players. 
We denote the set of Rawlsian stable matchings by Ra.4
Definition 2 (Rawlsian stable matchings).
Ra = arg max
g∈S mini∈N ui(g).
Example 1 (Stable matchings and Rawlsian stable matchings). Let M = {m1, m2}, W = {w1, w2}, and players’ payoffs from a 
given match be given by the matrix in Fig. 1. Payoffs from remaining single are assumed to be zero. The stable matchings 
are gM = {m1 w1, m2 w2} and gW = {m1 w2, m2 w1}. gM is the man-optimal matching and gW the woman-optimal matching. 
Note that mini∈N ui(gM) = uw1 (gM) = 2 and mini∈N ui(gW ) = um2 (gW ) = 5, therefore Ra = {gW }.
4 Masarani and Gokturk (1989) defines a version of such matchings, which they call stably fair, for an environment with ordinal preference rankings. This 
corresponds to our definition if we let the payoff from being matched to one’s kth favorite partner be equal to 1/k.
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m1 8,2 7,9
m2 5,6 7,5
Fig. 1. Payoffs for matchings in Example 1. Entries give payoffs for row and column players respectively from being matched to one another. For example, 
m1 obtains a payoff of 7 when matched to w2.
3.2. Dynamic rematching
We follow the dynamic process of rematching in Newton and Sawa (2015). Pairs of players meet and can decide whether 
to dissolve an existing partnership or create a new partnership. A player will usually only agree to a change of partner when 
this leads to a higher payoff for him or herself. However, from time to time, players make mistakes and take actions which 
reduce their payoffs, whether it be leaving or creating a partnership.
We consider a family of dynamic processes {Pη}η parameterized by η ∈ [0, η̄). Let gt be the network in period t . At the 
beginning of period t + 1, a pair of players (i, j) is selected at random according to a distribution F gt (.) with full support 
on {(i, j) : i ∈ M, j ∈ W }. Let gt+1 be determined as follows:
If i and j are currently matched together, they consider separating, and if they are not currently matched together, they 
consider forming a partnership. That is, they consider a move to the matching g′ given by
g′ =
{
gt − i j if gt(i) = j,
gt + i j if gt(i) = j. (3.1)
Each of i and j independently accept the proposed change with probabilities Aiη(gt , g′) and A
j
η(g
t , g′) respectively.5
For η = 0, we refer to the process as the unperturbed dynamic. We assume that, for all k ∈ N , Ak0(gt , g′) > 0 if and only 
if uk(g′) ≥ uk(g). That is, under the unperturbed dynamic, a player accepts a change if and only if he or she would not 
lose payoff from the change in question. For η > 0, we refer to the process as the perturbed dynamic. Under these dynamics, 
a player will, with positive probability, make a deviation and agree to a change that would reduce his or her payoff. We 
assume that Akη(gt , g′) is continuous in η and strictly positive for all η > 0.




t − i j with prob. 1 −
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1 − Aiη(gt , g′)
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1 − Aiη(gt, g′)
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If i and j are not currently together, they must both agree in order to form a new partnership. That is, if gt(i) = j, then
gt+1 =
{
gt + i j with prob. Aiη(gt, g′) A jη(gt, g′),
gt with prob. 1 − Aiη(gt, g′) A jη(gt, g′).
(3.3)
The unperturbed dynamic is essentially identical to the dynamic of Roth and Vande Vate (1990). Our results concern 
perturbations of such a dynamic. In particular, we study stationary distributions of such perturbed processes for small 
values of η. Therefore, we are interested in the exponential decay rates of acceptance probabilities as η → 0. We let these 
decay rates be given by a function ϕ :R ×R →R of the payoffs of the current matching and the proposed matching,
lim





) = ϕ (uk(gt), uk(g′)) for all k ∈ N. (3.4)
Note that uk(gt) ≤ uk(g′) implies that Akη(gt , g′) converges to Ak0(gt , g′) > 0 as η → 0, therefore ϕ(uk(gt), uk(g′)) = 0. If 
uk(gt) > uk(g′), then Akη(gt , g′) converges to Ak0(gt , g′) = 0 and we assume that this decay is at an exponential rate. That 
is, ϕ(uk(gt), uk(g′)) > 0.
Examples of strategy revision rules that satisfy our assumptions include best response with uniform deviations, applied 







0 if uk(g) ≤ uk(g′),
1 if uk(g) > uk(g′),
(3.5)
and the logit choice rule, applied to the marriage problem by Newton and Sawa (2015), which gives
5 This assumption of independent acceptance of a proposed change is not present in Newton and Sawa (2015). The model can be considered without 
this assumption, but the current presentation is more in keeping with typical practice in the field. Notably, it combines the class of rules considered by 
Maruta (2002) with the accept-reject form of coalitional decision making used by Sawa (2014) in defining coalitional logit choice.




) = max{0, uk(g) − uk(g′)} . (3.6)
If, conditional on u > u′ , ϕ(u, u′) only depends on its first argument, then Maruta (2002) refers to the rule as purely 
aspirational. Bilancini and Boncinelli (2020) refer to such rules as condition dependent.6 The definition we use here allows ϕ
to depend on its second argument, but only when the first argument is constant.
Definition 3. Behavior is condition dependent if ϕ is such that, for all u, u′, v, v ′ ∈ R, u > u′ , v > v ′ , u > v , we have that 
ϕ(u, u′) > ϕ(v, v ′).
That is, under condition dependence, a strictly higher current payoff leads to a strictly higher ϕ (when ϕ is positive), 
implying that acceptance of a detrimental change is less likely when current payoffs are higher.
3.3. Stationary distribution and stochastic stability
As a chain with η > 0 is irreducible, there exists a unique stationary distribution πη . For convenience, we assume the 
following.7
Assumption 1 (existence of limit).
π0 := lim
η→0 πη exists.
A matching g is stochastically stable if π0(g) > 0. This implies that there must exist at least one such matching. We 
denote the set of stochastically stable matchings by SS.
Definition 4 (stochastically stable matchings).
S S := {g ∈ G : π0(g) > 0}.
All stochastically stable matchings belong to recurrent classes of the unperturbed process (Young, 1993) and from any 
matching there exists a finite sequence of transitions under the unperturbed process that culminates in a stable matching 
being reached (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990; Jackson and Watts, 2002). Therefore, a set of states is a recurrent class of the 
unperturbed process if and only if it contains a single stable matching and no other states. Consequently, S S ⊆ S . The 
identity of the stochastically stable matchings is important, as for small error probabilities the process will spend almost all 
of the time at these matchings.
4. Results
Our first result is that condition dependence leads to Rawlsian stable matchings.
Theorem 1. If behavior is condition dependent, then ∀u ∈U, we have S S ⊆ Ra.
The proofs of our theorems require additional notation, concepts and results given in Appendix A. Here, we explain the 
logic behind Theorem 1 using Example 1. Recall that lower values of ϕ correspond to more probable transitions.
Step 1: The stable matchings from which transitions to another matching are least probable are a subset of the Rawlsian 
stable matchings.
By definition of a stable matching, any transition from a stable matching to another matching will involve at least one 
player losing payoff. Under condition dependence, the most probable such transition involves a player whose current payoff 




) = ϕ (2,0) .




) = ϕ (5,0) .
6 Maruta (2002) and Bilancini and Boncinelli (2020) consider coordination games played by members of a population against all other members. In 
Maruta (2002) deviation probabilities depend on the current average payoff from playing against all other players. In Bilancini and Boncinelli (2020)
deviation probabilities depend on the realized payoff after being randomly matched with one other player. In the current paper, each player has a maximum 
of a single partner, so these approaches are identical.
7 This condition could be avoided if stochastically stable states were defined as states for which πη(.)  0 as η → 0.
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m1 v, z z, u
m2 z, u u, z
Fig. 2. Payoffs for matchings to illustrate the logic of the proof of Theorem 2. Entries give payoffs for row and column players respectively from being 
matched to one another. Assume that z > u > v .
Definition 3 implies that ϕ(2, 0) < ϕ(5, 0), so it is easier to leave gM than it is to leave gW . This is a consequence of the 
lowest payoff of any player at gM (i.e., 2) being lower than the lowest payoff of any player at gW (i.e., 5). That is, gM /∈ Ra
and gW ∈ Ra.
Step 2: Stochastically stable matchings are a subset of the stable matchings from which transitions to another matching 
are least probable.
This is the one-shot deviation principle of Newton and Sawa (2015), a formal statement of which can be found in 
Appendix A.
Combining Steps 1 and 2, it must be that S S = {gW } = Ra in accordance with the statement of Theorem 1. Note that 
the argument given above is simplified as there are no single players at the stable matchings in Example 1. When there are 
single players at stable matchings, the argument is more involved and requires a series of lemmas given in Appendix B.
Our second result is that if behavior is not condition dependent, then there exist situations in which there are stochasti-
cally stable matchings which are not Rawlsian stable matchings.
Theorem 2. If behavior is not condition dependent, then ∃u ∈U such that S S  Ra.
We again describe the logic behind the theorem.
Step 1: Construct an example with two men and two women for which S S  Ra.
If behavior is not condition dependent, then Definition 3 implies that there exist u, u′, v, v ′ ∈ R, u > u′ , v > v ′ , u > v , 
such that ϕ(u, u′) ≤ ϕ(v, v ′).
Let M = {m1, m2}, W = {w1, w2}, and players’ payoffs from a given match be given by the matrix in Fig. 2. Payoffs 
from remaining single are v ′ for m1 and u′ for m2, w1, w2. The stable matchings are gW = {m1 w1, m2 w2} and gM =
{m1 w2, m2 w1}. gW is the woman-optimal matching and gM the man-optimal matching. Note that mini∈N ui(gW ) = v and 
mini∈N ui(gM) = u, therefore Ra = {gM}.
From gW , there are the following types of transition to another matching. m1 could accept a proposed separation from 
w1. This would change his payoff from v to v ′ , so the decay rate of the probability of his accepting this separation is given 
by ϕ(v, v ′). m2 could accept a proposed separation from w2. This would change his payoff from u to u′ , so the decay rate of 
the probability of his accepting this separation is given by ϕ(u, u′). One of the women could accept a proposed separation 
from her partner. This would change her payoff from z to u′ , so the decay rate of the probability of her accepting this 
separation is given by ϕ(z, u′). Finally, one of the women could match with the man to whom she is not currently matched. 
This would increase the man’s payoff, but would reduce the woman’s payoff from z to u, so the decay rate of the probability 
of both parties accepting this rematching is given by ϕ(z, u). Consequently, the most probable transition away from gW has 
a decay rate equal to
min
{
ϕ(v, v ′),ϕ(u, u′),ϕ(z, u′),ϕ(z, u)
}
. (4.1)
From gM , there are the following types of transition to another matching. m1 could accept a proposed separation from w2. 
This would change his payoff from z to v ′ , so the decay rate of the probability of his accepting this separation is given by 
ϕ(z, v ′). m2 could accept a proposed separation from w1. This would change his payoff from z to u′ , so the decay rate of the 
probability of his accepting this separation is given by ϕ(z, u′). One of the women could accept a proposed separation from 
her partner. This would change her payoff from u to u′ , so the decay rate of the probability of her accepting this separation 
is given by ϕ(u, u′). m1 and w1 could agree to match. This would increase the payoff of w1, but would reduce the payoff 
of m1 from z to v , so the decay rate of the probability of both parties accepting this rematching is given by ϕ(z, v). Finally, 
m2 and w2 could agree to match. This would increase the payoff of w2, but would reduce the payoff of m2 from z to u, 
so the decay rate of the probability of both parties accepting this rematching is given by ϕ(z, u). Consequently, the most 
probable transition away from gM has a decay rate equal to
min
{
ϕ(z, v ′),ϕ(z, u′),ϕ(u, u′),ϕ(z, v),ϕ(z, u)
}
. (4.2)
Recall that ϕ(v, v ′) ≥ ϕ(u, u′). It immediately follows that (4.2) is less than or equal to (4.1). That is, the most probable 
transition away from gM is at least as probable as the most probable transition away from gW .
Observe that in this example, following the initial transition away from a stable state, the unperturbed dynamic can 
reach the other stable state. Hence, by standard arguments (see, e.g. Young, 1993), gW ∈ S S . Therefore S S  Ra.
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m1 10,1 5,5 1,10
m2 1,10 10,1 5,5
m3 5,5 1,10 10,1
(i) ∀i ∈ N , ui(∅) = 0.
w1 w2 w3
m1 10,4 5,5 4,10
m2 4,10 10,4 5,5
m3 5,5 4,10 10,4
(ii) ∀i ∈ N , ui(∅) = 0.
w1 w2 w3
m1 0,1 −5,5 −9,10
m2 1,10 10,1 5,5
m3 5,5 1,10 10,1
(iii) um1 (∅) = −10 and ∀i ∈ N \ {m1}, ui(∅) = 0.
Fig. 3. Payoffs discussed in the example of Section 5. Payoffs in Panel (i) are the payoffs of Example 4.1 of Newton and Sawa (2015). Payoffs in Panel (ii)
are the payoffs in Panel (i) following an order-preserving transformation. Payoffs in Panel (iii) are the same as in Panel (i) except that payoffs of m1 have 
been reduced by 10.
Step 2: Extend the argument to account for an arbitrary number of players.
When there are players other than m1, m2, w1, w2, we set utilities so that every man in M prefers every woman in 
W \ {w1, w2} to every woman in {w1, w2}, and every woman in W prefers every man in M \ {m1, m2} to every man in 
{m1, m2}. Further, we set utilities so that players in N \ {m1, m2, w1, w2} would rather remain single than match with a 
player in {m1, m2, w1, w2} and that at any stable matching, players in N \ {m1, m2, w1, w2} match amongst themselves 
in a unique way. Consequently, there are two stable matchings, one at which players in {m1, m2, w1, w2} match as they 
do at gW , and one at which they match as they do at gM . Denote these matchings g̃W and g̃M . Further, let all payoffs 
for players in N \ {m1, m2, w1, w2} be high enough that the Rawlsian stable matchings are determined by the payoffs of 
{m1, m2, w1, w2}, therefore Ra = {g̃M}.
Note that if the process is at any matching at which the players in {m1, m2, w1, w2} are not stably matched amongst 
themselves, then either of g̃W and g̃M can be reached by the unperturbed dynamic. Consider a path from g̃W to such 
a matching. The last step on this path must be the only step that involves one or two players in {m1, m2, w1, w2}. If 
it involves two such players, then the additional players are irrelevant and the argument of Step 1 can be applied. If it 
involves one such player and one player from outside of {m1, m2, w1, w2}, then our choice of utilities guarantees that it is 
only a deviation for the latter player. Consequently, its probability is independent of the payoff of the former player. Now, 
consider the rematchings on the path just considered, only this time starting from g̃M . These rematchings are equally as 
probable as those on the earlier path and they terminate at a matching from which g̃W can be reached by the unperturbed 
dynamic. Consequently, once again we have g̃W ∈ S S and S S  Ra.
5. Comparison with other behavioral rules
Let M = {m1, m2, m3}, W = {w1, w2, w3}. We will consider the payoffs from each of the three panels of Fig. 3. Each 
player’s ordinal payoff ranking is the same across panels, so the set of stable matchings remains the same. There are three 
stable matchings, which are
g1 = {m1 w1,m2 w2,m3 w3}, g2 = {m1 w2,m2 w3,m3 w1}, g3 = {m1 w3,m2 w1,m3 w2}.
Note that g1 is man-optimal and g3 is woman-optimal. We shall consider three different processes of strategy updating and 
see how moving across the different payoff specifications in Fig. 3 changes equilibrium selection in each case.
5.1. Uniform deviations
Consider best response with uniform deviations as defined in expression (3.5) in Section 3. Under this behavioral rule, 
all stable matchings are stochastically stable (Jackson and Watts, 2002). Therefore, g1 , g2 and g3 are all stochastically stable.
5.2. Logit choice
Now consider logit choice as defined in expression (3.6) in Section 3. Deviation probabilities under logit choice depend 
only on cardinal payoff losses for the players making the deviation. Under this behavioral rule, stochastically stable states 
will be among those from which the payoff loss required for a deviation to take place is as great as possible (Newton and 
Sawa, 2015). First consider the payoffs in Panel (i). From g1, the lowest payoff loss from a deviation involves a woman 
becoming single and losing payoff of 1 − 0 = 1. From g3, the lowest payoff loss from a deviation involves a man becoming 
single and losing payoff of 1 − 0 = 1. However, from g2 the lowest payoff loss from a deviation involves a player leaving 
his current partner for his least preferred partner and losing payoff of 5 − 1 = 4. Consequently, g2 is uniquely stochastically 
stable. Adding or subtracting a constant from a player’s payoff, as is done to the payoffs of m1 in Panel (iii), does not change 
logit choice probabilities and hence g2 remains uniquely stochastically stable. However, if payoffs undergo a transformation 
that preserves payoff order but does not preserve cardinal differences, then logit choice probabilities will change. For the 
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a deviation away from g1 or g3 is 4 −0 = 4. This, together with the symmetry of the problem, implies that the stochastically 
stable matchings are g1 and g3.
5.3. Condition dependence
Finally, consider condition dependent behavior. Theorem 1 of the current paper implies that stochastically stable match-
ings are contained in Ra. For the payoffs in Panel (i), Ra = {g2} and hence g2 is uniquely stochastically stable. If all payoffs 
undergo an order-preserving transformation as in Panel (ii), this does not change Ra and g2 remains uniquely stochastically 
stable. However, adding or subtracting a constant from a player’s payoff, as is done to the payoffs of m1 in Panel (iii), even 
though it leaves all players’ individual orderings unchanged, may change interpersonal comparisons between players and 
hence change Ra. For the payoffs in Panel (iii), Ra = {g1} and hence g1 is uniquely stochastically stable. This is the stable 
matching that gives m1 the highest payoff. To see that this observation generalizes, note that if we reduce player i’s payoffs 
enough, while keeping other players’ payoffs fixed, then the Rawlsian stable matchings will be the stable matchings that 
maximize player i’s payoff.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have given a behavioral axiomatization of a social choice function. In marriage problems under per-
turbed pairwise best response dynamics, Rawlsian stable matchings emerge as long run social norms if and only if players 
follow condition dependent behavioral rules. There are a few possible directions for future research. First, there is the pos-
sibility that our result might extend to the roommate problem (one-sided matching) or the assignment problem (matching 
with transferable utility). Second, our approach could be followed to obtain behavioral axiomatizations of other social choice 
functions. Finally, similar to the approach pioneered by Sandholm (2005) for population games with negative externalities, 
one may study whether under a given class of behavioral rules, institutional aspects of the marriage market can be designed 
to facilitate the emergence of desired social norms. Such aspects might include marriage costs, divorce costs and restrictions 
on admissible partnerships due to geography and social status.
Appendix A. Additional notation and ancillary results
A.1. Costs of transitions
The identity of stochastically stable states depends on the transition probabilities of the process. To measure the limiting 
relative magnitude of these probabilities, a cost function is defined as follows.
Definition 5. The 1-step cost of the process moving from g to g′ is defined as:
c(g, g′) := lim
η→0 −η log Pη(g, g
′), (A.1)
adopting the convention that − log 0 = ∞.
c(g, g′) is the exponential decay rate of the transition probability from g to g′ . The rarer a transition, the higher its cost. 
Impossible transitions have infinite cost. Note that for g /∈ S , there is a zero cost transition from g . This is because there is 
some g′ = g , such that Pη(g, g′) does not approach zero as η → 0.





F g(i, j) Aiη(g, g





1 − Aiη(g, g′)
) (
1 − A jη(g, g′)
))
if g′ = g − i j for some i j ∈ g,
0 if g′ /∈ {g + i j, g − i j} for any i ∈ M, j ∈ W ,
(A.2)
and Pη(g, g) = 1 − ∑g′ =g Pη(g, g′).
















u j(g), u j(g′)
)}
if g′ = g − i j for some i j ∈ g,
∞ otherwise.
(A.3)
To prove Theorem 2 in Appendix C we also require notation for the overall cost of moving between g and g′ , even 
if many steps are required. We denote with S(g, g′) the set containing all sequences of matchings (gz)kz=0, with g0 = g , 
gk = g′ , and k ≥ 1.
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A.2. The one-shot deviation principle
We call a transition g → g′ from a matching g ∈ G the least cost deviation from g if it has the lowest cost of all possible 
1-step transitions from g .
Definition 7. Denote the set of possible least cost deviations from g ∈ G by:
L(g) := arg min
g′ =g
c(g, g′)
and the set of pairs of players involved in least cost deviations from g ∈ G by:
NL(g) := {(i, j) ∈ M × W : ∃ g′ ∈ L(g) : g′ = g − i j or g′ = g + i j}




We use the word deviation as we shall be interested in the application of these concepts to g ∈ S .
Define OS, the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation:
OS =
{






As cL(g) is strictly positive only for g ∈ S , it must be that OS ⊆ S . Newton and Sawa (2015) show that O S contains S S: a 
stochastically stable matching must be comparatively robust against one-shot deviation. If OS contains only one matching, 
then that matching must be uniquely stochastically stable.
Theorem 3 (Newton and Sawa (2015), Theorem 3.4). S S ⊆ O S.
Appendix B. Sufficiency of condition dependence for Rawlsian selection
Define MM, the set of stable matchings at which the players with the lowest payoff are matched players:
MM =
{
g ∈ S : ∀i ∈ arg min
k
uk(g), g(i) = ∅.
}
Lemma 1. If MM = S, then MM ∩ O S = ∅.
Proof. Note that the set of unmatched players is the same at every g ∈ S . If no player is unmatched at any g ∈ S , then by 
definition of MM , we have that MM = S , which would contradict the assumption of the lemma that MM = S . Therefore, 
there must be a nonempty set of players that is unmatched at every g ∈ S . There are two cases to consider.
Case 1. MM = ∅.
If MM = ∅, then MM ∩ O S = ∅ is immediate.
Case 2. MM = ∅.
Consider g ∈ MM . Let
j ∈ arg min
k:g(k)=∅
uk(g). (B.1)
By definition of MM , there exists i such that g(i) = ∅ and ui(g) < u j(g). By (A.3),
8 This differs from the concept of the radius of a stable state g ∈ S (Ellison, 2000, citing a no longer extant working paper of Evans, 1993). The radius is 
defined as R(g) = ming′∈S\{g} C(g, g′) and requires a different stable state to be reached by the process. It turns out that in the problems considered in the 
current paper cL(g) = R(g) for all stable matchings outside of a specific set, but this does not follow from the definitions.
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≤ ϕ(ui(g), ui(g − ig(i))).









and δ > ui(g) > ui(g − ig(i))
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Consider g′ ∈ S \ MM . As the sets of unmatched players at g and g′ are identical, we argue that every player at g′ obtains 
a payoff of at least u j(g′) = u j(g). For unmatched players, this follows directly from (B.1). For matched players, it follows 




′) = u j(g′) = u j(g). (B.4)















as condition dependence implies
that lowering uk gives lower ϕ(uk, u′)
for all u′ < uk , hence minimum


















Expressions (B.3) and (B.5), taken together, imply cL(g) < cL(g′). It follows from the definition of O S that g /∈ O S .
As the above argument holds for any g ∈ MM , it follows that MM ∩ O S = ∅. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. If MM = S, then Ra = S \ MM.
Proof. Note that the set of unmatched players is the same at every g ∈ S . If no player is unmatched at any g ∈ S , then by 
definition of MM , we have that MM = S , which would contradict the assumption of the lemma that MM = S . Therefore, 
there must be a nonempty set of players that is unmatched at every g ∈ S .
For some g ∈ S , define j as in expression (B.1). Note that as the set of unmatched players and hence the payoffs of 
unmatched players are the same at every stable matching, it does not matter which g ∈ S we use. Let u∗j be the payoff of j









uk(g) = u∗j for all g ∈ S \ MM. (B.7)
From (B.6), (B.7) and the definition of Ra, it follows that if g ∈ MM , then g /∈ Ra, and if g ∈ S \ MM , then g ∈ Ra. Q.E.D.








Lemma 4. If MM = S, then O S ⊆ Ra.
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By definition of MM , g(i∗) = ∅.












by defn of sup






























Note that, by definition, Ra = ∅.
If Ra = S , then O S ⊆ S = Ra and we are done.
If Ra = S , let g′ ∈ Ra and g′′ ∈ S \ Ra.
As MM = S (as assumed in the lemma statement), we have g′, g′′ ∈ MM and therefore (B.9) and (B.10) apply to g′ and 
g′′ .














as condition dependence implies
that lowering uk gives lower ϕ(uk, u′)
for all u′ < uk , hence minimum















































Expression (B.11) gives cL(g′) > cL(g′′). It follows from the definition of O S that g′′ /∈ O S .
As the above argument holds for any g′′ /∈ Ra, it follows that O S ⊆ Ra. Q.E.D.




by Lemmas 3, 4
Ra. Q.E.D. (B.12)
Appendix C. Necessity of condition dependence for Rawlsian selection
Proof of Theorem 2. In the following we show by construction that ∃u ∈U such that: S = {g, g′}, g /∈ Ra, and g ∈ S S .
Suppose w.l.o.g. that l = |W | ≤ |M| = k. We set g = {m1 w1, m2 w2} ∪ g , g′ = {m1 w2, m2 w1} ∪ g, with g = {mi+k−l wi |∀i ∈
N, 2 < i ≤ l}. Preferences of players in {m1, m2, w1, w2} over themselves are denoted as in Table 1, where z > u > v > v ′ , 
u > u′; moreover, we set ui({i j}) > z ∀(i, j) such that either i ∈ {m1, m2} and j ∈ W \ {w1, w2}, or i ∈ {w1, w2} and j ∈ M \
{m1, m2}. Finally, for i ∈ M \ {m1, m2}, we set ui({iwr}) > ui({iwr′ }) whenever r > r′ , and ui({iw3}) > ui(∅) > z > ui({iw2}). 
Analogously, for i ∈ W \{w1, w2}, we set ui({imr}) > ui({imr′ }) whenever r > r′ , and ui({im3}) > ui(∅) > z > ui({im2}). Given 
the listed inequalities on preferences, S = {g, g′}, and g /∈ Ra.
In order to determine which matchings are stochastically stable, we start by identifying C(g, g′). Since any single addi-
tion/deletion of an edge involving at least one player in {m1, m2, w1, w2} is enough to reach a matching from which g′ is 
reachable in the unperturbed dynamics (hence, C(ĝ, g′) = 0), and given that C(g, g′) is the minimum cost of the process 
moving from g to g′ , we focus on sequences where all initial steps do not involve any player in {m1, m2, w1, w2}, followed 
E. Bilancini et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 123 (2020) 68–80 79Table 1
Payoffs for players in {m1, m2, w1, w2}. The 
letter in each cell of the matrix refers to 
the payoff earned by the row player when 
matched to the column player. When a 
player is matched to him or herself, it is to 
be intended as remaining alone.
player m1 m2 w1 w2
m1 v ′ / v z
m2 / u′ z u
w1 z u u′ /
w2 u z / u′
Table 2
Cost of the single step involving at least one agent in {m1, m2, w1, w2}, when 
moving from g to g′ and from g′ to g .
c(g̃, ĝ) step c(g̃′, ĝ′) step
min{ϕ(v, v ′),ϕ(z, u′)} −m1 w1 min{ϕ(z, v ′),ϕ(u, u′)} −m1 w2
min{ϕ(u, u′),ϕ(z, u′)} −m2 w2 min{ϕ(z, u′),ϕ(u, u′)} −m2 w1
ϕ(z, u) +m1 w2 ϕ(z, v) +m1 w1
ϕ(z, u) +m2 w1 ϕ(z, u) +m2 w2
ϕ(uĩ(g̃), uĩ(g̃ + ĩ j̃)) +ĩ j̃ ϕ(uĩ′ (g̃′), uĩ(g̃′ + ĩ′ j̃′)) +ĩ′ j̃′
by a step where at least one player in {m1, m2, w1, w2} is involved, with all remaining steps occurring in the unperturbed 
dynamics.
Suppose that a sequence with minimum cost has initial steps that lead from g = {m1 w1, m2 w2} ∪ g to g̃ :=
{m1 w1, m2 w2} ∪ g (possibly, no such initial steps are needed and g = g),9 and then a step from g̃ to ĝ := {m1 w1, m2 w2} ∪
g ± i j, with {i, j} ∩ {m1, m2, w1, w2} = ∅. We can hence write
C(g, g′) = C(g, g̃) + c(g̃, ĝ) + C(ĝ, g′), (C.1)
with
C(g, g̃) = C
(
{m1 w1,m2 w2} ∪ g, {m1 w1,m2 w2} ∪ g
)
, (C.2)
c(g̃, ĝ) = c
(
{m1 w1,m2 w2} ∪ g, {m1 w1,m2 w2} ∪ g + i j
)
, (C.3)
C(ĝ, g′) = 0. (C.4)
Next, we show that there exists a sequence from g′ to g with an associated cost that is smaller than or equal to C(g, g′). 
In particular, we consider
C(g′, g̃′) + c(g̃′, ĝ′) + C(ĝ′, g) (C.5)
where g̃′ := {m1 w2, m2 w1} ∪ g, and ĝ′ := g̃′ ± i′ j′ , for some i′ j′ such that {i′, j′} ∩ {m1, m2, w1, w2} = ∅. We note that from 




{m1 w2,m2 w1} ∪ g, {m1 w2,m2 w1} ∪ g
)
, (C.6)
which is equal to the quantity in (C.2), because no transitions on the relevant paths for (C.2) and (C.6) involve any player 
in {m1, m2, w1, w2}. We are left to show that c(g̃′, ̂g′) ≤ c(g̃, ̂g), of which all possible values are reported in Table 2, where 
ĩ /∈ {m1, m2, w1, w2}, j̃ ∈ {m1, m2, w1, w2}. We observe that any cost in the list from g̃ to ĝ appears in the list from g̃′ to ĝ′
as well, but for ϕ(v, v ′). However, we know that ϕ(v, v ′) ≥ ϕ(u, u′) (the latter being in the list from g̃′ to ĝ′).
Therefore, we can conclude that C(g, g′) ≥ C(g′, ̃g′) + c(g̃′, ̂g′) + C(ĝ′, g) ≥ C(g′, g), which in turn implies g ∈ S S . Q.E.D.
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